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THE STATUS OF ARMED FORCES ABROAD
Robert C. Grabb
The question of the status of armed
forces abroad presents a problem to the
United States only because this era has
seen, for the first time, the stationing of
our troops on foreign sovereign soil for
lengthy periods-in peacetime. The impact of this situation is, of course,
greater on the Army and Air Force than
upon the Navy, which is more accustomed to sailing foreign seas, and which
has fewer personnel ashore. Nevertheless, a multitude of problems confronts
all our forces in the wake of the policy
of the United States that the interests of
this country are best served with a
security system of allied nations, each
contributing toward common defense
goals and each at the same time remaining politically and economically stable.
Because of the independent political
stature of these nations, our armed
forces stationed abroad must not be
considered as occupying forcesalthough Communist "Ami, Go Home"
propaganda would have the world think
so. They are present with the consent of
the local government and can legally
remain there only with that consent.
The rights and duties of our forces in
these countries are normally spelled out
in agreements of varying scope-and it is
these status of forces arrangements
which I will discuss, with emphasis on
problems of jurisdiction.
Our military, air and naval forces are
permanently stationed in foreign jurisdiction in several capacities:

First: the Mission groups most frequently found in South and Central
America consisting of advisors who remain subject to United States military
law and who are subject only in some
instances to local jurisdiction. Their
privileges and immunities are specified
in the various Mission Agreements.
Second: MAAG personnel, functioning under our Mutual Defense Assistance Agreements, who enjoy full diplomatic immunity in some cases, and are
subject to the concurrent jurisdiction of
the United States and of the local
jurisdiction in others. Generally, MAAG
personnel are assigned to the United
States Embassy and receive privileges of
personnel of corresponding rank in the
diplomatic mission.
Third: Members of the International
Military Headquarters of NATO who
receive privileges and immunities as
specified in the applicable NATO Agreements, particularly the Headquarters
Protocol.
Fourth: Forces in such places as the
Ryukyu Islands, which, although not
United States territory, are subject only
to the jurisdictional control of the
United States.
.
Fifth, and most important: Ordinary
forces stationed in nations allied with
the United States-performing garrison
duty, maintaining defense installations,
or performing logistical. tasks. The question of the legal status of this largest
group-military personnel, civilian
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employees and dependents-and its relationship to the local authorities is the
source of the problem I am to discuss
today.
A demand for extraterritorial rightsthat is, complete immunity from local
jurisdiction-is often impossible in light
of the extreme sensitivity of the host
government towards such arrangements.
However, we have been able to secure in
some countries-such as the Philippines
and Saudi Arabia-the right to use and
occupy specific areas in a manner that
is, in many ways, extraterritoriaL
Rights as extensive as these, however,
can not always be secured. The spectre
of colonialism and imperialism is a
frightening one to many of our allies
and extraterritoriality is envisaged as a
symbol of exploited peoples. Agreements guiding the relationship between
our armed forces and the authorities of
the receiving state are therefore indispensable. These arrangements differ
in their details because of varying conditions in host countries. Account must
be taken of the number of forces to be
stationed, their composition, their particular mission, and the law of the host
country. The situation in Italy is illustrative of the necessity for an agreement
with the national government. Italy has
not ratified the NATO Status of Forces
Agreement. As a result, our forces there
must operate with informal local agreements which have doubtful standing,
and under the law miscreants can, in
most instances, expect trial only in
Italian courts.
The Status of Forces arrangements
which bring some order into this seeming chaos have three principal purposes.
They are designed to reduce to the
fullest extent possible the administrative
burden of the commanders of the forces
by limiting local interference; second, to
reduce the area of possible dispute with
the host countries; and, thirdly, to
protect the rights and property of members of the forces and the inhabitants of
the host country. Underlying these

purposes is the principle that these
agreements must enhance the mission of
the forces in the regional arrangement
concerned. For example, the forces
must be free to move, when required,
across national frontiers without undue
restriction. This is particularly necessary, of course, in Europe.
Most of these agreements have been
negotiated during a period of peace.
During time of war, the mission of the
forces is of such importance that rights
normally considered basic can be surrendered or waived by the host country
with no loss of national prestige. An
example of this can be seen in the
Korean conflict, where an exchange of
notes on 12 July 1950 provided that
United States courts-martial would exercise exclusive jurisdiction over all members of United States forces for all
offenses.
The Status of Forces Agreement, on
the other hand, negotiated among the
NATO nations, is primarily designed as
a peacetime agreement. It contains a
provision that upon the outbreak of
hostilities its claims provisions will not
apply to war damage, and that with 60
days' notice any provision of the agreement can be suspended. The Agreement
with Japan is similar. Some Forces
Agreements include a provision that in
the case of war, exclusive criminal jurisdiction for all offenses will rest in the
United States.
Several jurisdictional agreements
have been negotiated within the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization. Three of these were submitted to, and have been ratified by, the
Senate. One agreement gives the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization a juridical
personality and enumerates rights and
privileges of the persons attached to the
Organization. Generally, international
representatives of the internal staff,
most of whom are civilians, receive the
same privileges as are accorded to
similar persons in the United Nations
and in the Organization of American
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States. The second NATO Agreement is
the Headquarters Protocol to the Status
of Forces Agreement, which gives international military headquarters such as
SHAPE and SACLANT and the Channel
Command juridical personality and
enumerates the rights and duties of its
personnel. The Status of Forces Agreement (in shorthand-NATO SOF) is the
third of these NATO subsidiary agreements, and it concerns itself with the
rights and duties of the ordinary military forces, the civilian components,
and their dependents, and contains extensive provisions guiding the jurisdictional prerogatives of both the sending
and receiving states.
While these NATO agreements are
more extensive than those which we
have negotiated with other countries,
they reflect the problems we meet
around the world.' In summary, the
provisions of NATO SOF can be outlined as follows insofar as jurisdiction is
concerned:
In a few rare cases the sending
state-that is, the United States in the
cases of our forces abroad-has exclusive
criminal jurisdiction. For example,
where an act is a violation of United
States law but not of the law of the host
country, the United States has exclusive
jurisdiction. Conversely, the receiving
state has exclusive jurisdiction in some
instances. This is over acts which are
offenses against the local law but not
the law of the sending state. These are
generally security offenses, espionage, et
cetera.
For the most part, the Agreement
provides a system of concurrent jurisdiction. This is the nub of the setup. If the
offense is committed by a member of
the visiting forces and is solely against
the property or security of the sending
state, or if the offense is solely against
the person or property of another member of the force or civilian component
or of a dependent of that state, or if the
offense arises out of any act or omission
done in the performance of official

duty, then the jurisdiction of the sending state is deemed primary. They have
the first right to try.
In all other cases the host or receiving state has the first right to try,
and this category includes the
ubiquitous breach of peace and traffic
offense. Once the accused is tried by
one state, he can not be tried in the
same country for the same offense by
the other state. The authorities of the
state having the primary right to exercise jurisdiction are required to give
"sympathetic consideration" to requests
for a waiver of jurisdiction hy the other
state, in important cases.
In trials before courts of the receiving state, definite rights must be
accorded for the protection of the
accused. He is entitled to a prompt and
speedy trial; he must be informed in
advance of the charges against him; he
has the right to confront witnesses; he
has the right to a competent interpreter
and to legal counsel; and, finally, to
communicate with his government. In
every case arisen so far where a person
subject to our military law has .been
tried in a foreign court, an observer
from the armed forces-usually a
lawyer-has been present to note the
proceedings and render a report. If it is
considered that a criminal proceeding
has resulted in a denial of justice, or
that a member of the forces has not
received proper procedural treatment,
diplomatic overtures will be made to
secure redress. The Senate, in ratifying
the Status of Forces Agreement, stated
that a waiver of jurisdiction should be
sought wherever there is a danger that
the accused will not be protected because of the absence or denial of constitutional rights he would enjoy in the
United States. If the waiver is denied,
the Senate has directed that the com~
man ding officer shall request the Department of State to press the request
through diplomatic channels. The
Attorney General in the paper before
you expresses the view that these
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criminal jurisdictional arrangements
afford the soldier greater protection
than he would enjoy without them.
Each of the services maintains an
up-to-date record of the actual operation of these criminal jurisdictiOlial arrangements, and reports thereon are
rendered regularly to the Congress,
which has shown great interest in these
treaties and agreements.
There is nothing like a series of
scintillating statistics to bring any
audience to its knees. Realizing this, I
am going to give you only five sets
which point up our worldwide experience.
During the period from 1 December
1954 to 31 May 1955, four thousand
four hundred and fifty-eight (4,458)
persons subject to United States military law were accused of offenses which
fell under the jurisdiction of foreign
courts. A waiver of jurisdiction was
obtained from the foreign authorities in
66.2% of these cases. One thousand two
hundred and fifty-eight (1,258) persons
were tried by foreign tribunals during
this six-months period, and of these
only one hundred and forty-one (141)
could be considered serious offenders. It
is particularly interesting to note that
sentences to confinement were actually
imposed-not suspended-in only fiftyone (51) cases during this period.
Perhaps the most notorious case
seized upon by the press is that of
Privates Richard Keefe and Anthony
Scaletti. Sad tales have been told of how
these lads, engaging in a boyish prank,
seized a taxi and went joyriding. For
this they were reportedly sentenced to
five years in solitary confinement in a
'small cell in France, where they have
been ignored and forgotten by their
countrymen.
The facts are somewhat different.
Keefe and Scaletti, each of whom had
an impressive record of courts-martial,
met in a stockade in Germany. After
being released from the guardhouse,
they went AWOL again into France, got

drunk in Orleans, and, deciding to go to
Paris, hailed a taxi. Upon leaving
Orleans, they stopped the cab and beat
and choked the sixty-five year old
driver, leaving him beside the road. His
injuries were so severe that he was
incapacitated for about a month. After
this demonstration of boyish glee, Keefe
and Scaletti, with the cab, went to Paris,
where they were arrested several days
later. The French refused our request to
waive jurisdiction and Keefe and
Scaletti were tried by the Assizes Court
in Orleans on 27 October 1953. They
were charged with having stolen a
vehicle, during the night, on a public
highway, with violence. A French attorney was appointed by the French
court to represent them, and they were
tried jointly before a' jury of seven
persons. The French Penal Code provides that one who is guilty of theft
under these circumstances may be
punished at hard labor for life. Sentences against French persons for offenses similar to that committed by
Keefe and Scaletti have ranged from ten
years to life, and, even in the light of
these sentences, French taxi drivers not
long ago staged a nation-wide, one-hour
protest strike because of the light sentences given to persons who robbed or
attacked cab drivers. Although not required to testify, Keefe and Scaletti
confessed their crimes before the
French court and were sentenced to five
years' imprisonment. This was later
reduced by six months and they will be
eligible for parole next month, two
years later. The American observer at
the trial stated that in his opinion the
trial was fair and that no rights guaranteed by the NATO Status Forces Agreement, or usually enjoyed under American law, were denied them.
Keefe and Scaletti are presently confined in a French prison, where they are
periodically visited by Army authorities.
No reason for complaint has been found,
and both men recently freely expressed
satisfaction with their treatment.
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This case had an impact in United
States courts because Keefe's wife
applied for a writ of habeas corpus. The
courts denied release, holding that they
had no jurisdiction. Although the courts
did not decide on constitutional
grounds, they did note that the French
proceedings were reportedly fair. The
Supreme Court recently denied
certiorari.
Thus far, only one case has been
reported in which the full formal procedure called for in the Senate Resolution has been invoked; i.e., report to
Congress and diplomatic protest. This
case arose in France and involved one
Private First Class Jerry Baldwin, who
was found guilty of an assault upon a
French national by a French court at
Orleans on October 7, 1953 and sentenced to pay a fine of 6,000 francs, or
about $18.00. In view of the fact that
the accused had not been confronted
with witnesses against him, as required
by the Status of Forces Agreement, a
protest was made to the French
Ministry of Justice. The Ministry accordingly directed that the sentence of
the court be appealed by the Public
Prosecutor. Baldwin appeared in person
at the appeal, represented by a qualified
French attorney. No witnesses appeared, and the evidence was presented
in the same manner as at the trial; that
is, by heresay. Private Baldwin reiterated his denial of the offense
charged against him. The Prosecutor
failed to advise the Appellate Court of
the specific reason for the appeal by the
Ministry of Justice, and, since as a rule
such appeals are ordered by the Ministry
only in cases where the sentence
adjudged by the lower courts was considered inadequate, the Court of
Appeals confirmed the lower court's
conviction of Private Baldwin, and increased the fine to 12,000 francs. This
bit of confusion thoroughly disconcerted everyone, and a new protest
was made to the Ministry of Justice
through the United States Embassy in

Paris. The Ministry of Justice then
remitted the fine against Private Baldwin and instructed the prosecutor to
insure the avoidance of similar errors in
the future. The French Foreign Office
has expressed its regret for the repetition of error on the part of the Appellate Court. Private Baldwin, with his
fine remitted, desired that no further
appeal be taken.
The effect of a waiver of jurisdiction
by the foreign authorities raises one
thorny problem which still plagues us.
In November, 1953, an Air Force
officer was involved in an automobile
accident in France and a Canadian
officer, who was a passenger in the car,
was killed. Pursuant to the request of
the appropriate United States commander, French authorities waived their
primary right to exercise jurisdiction in
this case. Thereafter, following formal
investigation under the provisions of
Article 32 of the Uniform Code of
Military Justice, the "senior officer
present" in France delivered a written
finding to the effect that there was
insufficient evidence to warrant courtmartial action against the officer. Based
on this finding, the Air Force officer's
automobile insurance company refused
the widow's demands for compensation.
She thereupon initiated a personal
action against the officer, under the
French Code, which permits its courts
to consider an action to adjudicate both
criminal and civil liability.
The Air Force officer was tried and
convicted of involuntary homicide and
was sentenced to pay a fine and
damages. During the trial, it was argued
that France had waived its right to
exercise jurisdiction. The court held,
however, that the waiver by the public
prosecutor did not deprive an individual
of his rights under the French Constitution to initiate a personal action
against another; that the court must
entertain such action and determine
both criminal and civil liability; and that
waivers of jurisdiction are valid only in
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cases in which third persons would have
no cause of action for civil and criminal
redress.
With respect to the double jeopardy
provjsion of the NATO Status of Forces
Agreement, the court held that the
considerations of the commanding
officer and his decision not to courtmartial were administrative determinations without judicial significance as
they did not put a defendant in
jeopardy, and, as such, did not preclude
action on the offense by the court.
International wrestling, in an effort to
solve this dilemma, still continues.
The overall picture of these arrangements has, I believe, been obscured by
an intense and generally uninformed
concern over the criminal jurisdictional
provisions. Criminal jurisdiction is a
subject of only one article among
twenty in the Status of Forces Agreement-just one of the questions which
must be answered.
Matters of taxation are very complex. What local taxes may the visiting
force legitimately be required to pay,
and to what extent should members of
the forces be required to pay taxes? The
Status of Forces Agreement considers in
some detail the tax liability of individual members of the forces, civilian
component and their dependents.
Article X, for example, provides in
effect that for purposes of taxation no
member of the forces or civilian component shall be deemed a resident or
domiciliary of the receiving state. This is
quite clear, but difficulties arise because
some taxes of the receiving state may
fall upon persons whether they be residents or not. Generally, we can not
complain when the tax is of the same
general nature as those normally imposed upon service personnel while stationed in this country. Included are
taxes imposed to supply services rendered to the forces, such as water
supply, sewerage, street lighting, and
electricity. But there are many other
examples of taxes which it is clear our

personnel should not pay. This includes
income taxes, personal property taxes
and inheritance taxes. In negotiating
status arrangements with other countries, therefore-and you would be
amazed how many military man hours
go into this pastime (one day it may be
you)-it is necessary to contemplate the
type of taxes which our people should
not be required to pay. There is no easy
solution. Patient negotiation with the
host country is almost invariably required, together with a careful examination of foreign tax laws.
Status of Forces arrangements must
consider customs and duties. The host
country is anxious to prevent so-called
luxury goods from falling into the local
economy, where they are likely to
disrupt trade and encourage blackmarket operation. Controls are therefore necessary, as well as exemptions.
Article XI meets some of these difficulties by providing an exemption upon
personal effects, private vehicles, and
other goods imported for the use of
members of the forces and their dependents. These goods can be imported
free of customs, but they can not be
disposed of on the local market. Of
course equipment, provisions and
ordinary supplies for the use of the
armed services them~elves are imported
free of duty.
Besides taxation and customs problems there arises the ever-present matter
of claims. Compensation should be provided for physical damage to property
in the receiving state. However, since
the visiting forces are present for mutual
defense, the burden must be borne by
both the sending and receiving state.
Therefore, the Status of Forces Agreement provides that the receiving state
shall waive smaller claims for damage to
certain property. In questionable cases,
the parties have agreed to abide by the
decision of an arbitrator. A particularly
interesting provision states that costs
incurred in satisfying both public and
private claims for damages caused by
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the forces of the sending state shall be
chargeable 25% to the receiving state
and 75% to the sending state. This
arrangement, also found in the Agreement with Japan, is designed to discourage a multitude of specious claims.
The claims arrangement, I might add,
functions so smoothly we hardly know
it is there.
Jurisdictional agreements must also
contemplate many questions surrounding the use and employment of local
labor, the extent to which the forces
must comply with local labor legislation, processing of employment claims,
status of employment of nonappropriated fund activities (are they members of the civilian component?)-all
these are ever·present questions.
Other problems include the status of
the nonappropriated fund activities
themselves, nongovernmental agencies
such as the Red Cross, United States
universities with troop educational programs, and like institutions. The Agreement touches visas, drivers' licenses, and
currency control laws as well.
These Forces Agreements are an innovation for us, and their only true test
is how they actually work. It has been
the Army's position that by and large
they are working well, although they
have their growing pains and may have
more. They do not provide answers for
every problem, but they do constitute a
base upon which to proceed. To make
them work, good will and effort at the
local level are required. It has been our
experience that most foreign officials
are as eager as we to eliminate sources
of friction, especially in the inflammable field of criminal jurisdiction. For
example, at our request Japanese authorities have arranged to confine in one
modern Tokyo jail all United States

prisoners -convicted in Japanese courts.
In Luxembourg, where we have no
troops but where many of our service
people rent houses, local arrangements
have been concluded by which these
persons are treated as though members
of the forces-not as tourists or itinerants. In Turkey, the primary jurisdiction
of United States authorities has been
extended to include all persons subject
to United States military law, except
United States contractors and Turkish
residents.
Although statistics indicate that
these status agreements are working well,
we do not feel that we can be complacent. It is the duty of the services to
assure to all personnel a fair trial and fair
treatment. This must not be adversely
affected by their being subjected to the
jurisdiction of foreign courts.
If my remarks have had a tone about
them which smacks of the defensive, I
ask your indulgence. For the past
several months, I have been a member
of the Department of Defense team
which has been opposing the plethora of
bills in Congress (more than a dozen)
which would call for our withdrawal
from any treaty which permits
American servicemen to be tried by a
foreign court. Yet, these agreements are
the basic charter under which we carry
out our global strategy. Without them,
our overseas bases could not exist. They
are of utmost importance to the strategic and tactical programs which you
must devise and implement. They are
the law. We might wish they were more
favorable to the United States, but they
represent joint action by the allies. It is
in our interest, as military men, to see
that they work-that they provide an
effective bridge with our allies, not a
wall against them.

- - - - - '¥ - - - - -

